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FIFTH ANNUAL  LLOYD  K. GARRISON
LECTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW
Thirty Years of Environmental Protection
Law in  the Supreme Court
RiCHARD  J.  LAzARus*
It is an honor to present a lecture named after Lloyd Garrison
and  to  be  here  at  Pace  Law  School.  It  is  especially  fitting,  of
course,  that  the first  Garrison  Lecture  was presented  by  Pace's
own David  Sive.  Professor  Sive,  as we  all know,  worked  closely
with Garrison  on the celebrated  Scenic Hudson litigation.1  Few
legal counsel have been so closely identified with the emergence  of
the environmental  law profession during the past three decades.
*  John Carroll Research Professor of Law,  Georgetown University Law Center.
This article and the underlying factual  information was first presented  at Pace Law
School on March 11,  1999, as the Fifth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environ-
mental  Law, but has  been updated in  light of a few  events  occurring subsequent to
that presentation.  Because this lecture  does not lend itself to a full presentation  of
the statistical  compilation  of United States  Supreme  Court rulings  underlying  the
lecture or to a complete elaboration of the related analysis, that fuller version is being
separately  published.  See  Richard  J.  Lazarus,  Restoring What's  "Environmental"
About Environmental  Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 703 (2000).  Spe-
cial thanks  are owed  to  Staci Krupp,  J.D.  Candidate  2000,  Georgetown  University
Law Center,  and Alex Steffan,  J.D.  1999,  Georgetown  University  Law  Center, who
provided  excellent  research  assistance  in the  preparation  of the initial  lecture  and
this article.  This article discusses  Supreme Court  decisions in many cases, including
some in which  I served as  counsel for  parties  involved  in the  litigation.  The  views
expressed  in this article  are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of those
parties  I represented.
1.  Scenic Hudson  Preservation  Conference  v.  Federal  Power Commission,  354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),  cert. denied, 384  U.S. 941 (1966).
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Indeed, if there were such a thing as a legal thesaurus that linked
substantive areas of law with lawyers and one looked up "environ-
mental  law,"  its  first  synonym  would  undoubtedly  be  "David
Sive."
2
I do not and could not, however, make claim to the extraordi-
nary pedigree of David Sive: one of the first of the very first gener-
ation of modern environmental lawyers in this country.  Nor can a
fair  comparison  be  made to  the  other  three  Garrison  Lecturers
who  preceded  me:  Professors  Joe  Sax,  Bill  Rodgers,  and  Oliver
Houck.  These are true pioneers.  They inspired  much in the for-
mation of modem environmental  protection law, and have served
since  in  their  scholarship  and  their  legal  counsel  as  the  law's
guardians  and promoters.
But what I strive to claim is a close lineage, as the first of the
second generation  of environmental  lawyers  and  scholars  to  de-
liver  this  lecture.  I  use  the  term  "lineage"  deliberately.  For
although  I  did  not then  know  any of them by name,  it  was the
work of Lloyd Garrison, David Sive, and the others that resulted
in my own decision to engage in the study and practice of environ-
mental law.
I made my decision  to become  an environmental  lawyer dur-
ing my  freshman  year  in college  in  1971,  because  of the  events
then occurring in our nation.  Like many of my contemporaries  in
environmental law, I saw as my role models those environmental
law activists who seemed to be shaping the nation's future in nec-
essary and positive ways.  So it should be no surprise that I feel a
great debt to those who preceded me as Garrison lecturers, and to
Lloyd  Garrison, whom I  never had the pleasure  to meet.
As much as I deliberately, if not obsessively, struck a path of
becoming  an  environmental  lawyer  and  law  professor  twenty-
eight years  ago, the actual  direction of that path has necessarily
been  the result  of much  happenstance  and  fortuity.  One  bit  of
good  fortune  has been  my  consistent  involvement with the  U.S.
Supreme Court, both as a practicing lawyer and a legal academic. 3
2.  Professor Sive  is often referred  to as the "father of environmental  law."  See
Margaret  Cronin  Fisk, Profiles in Power 100  - The  Most Influential Lawyers in
America, NAT'L  L.J.,  March 25,  1991,  at S2.
3.  I joined the Department of Justice in the fall of 1979,  after law school gradua-
tion.  The  Court soon after granted review in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447  U.S. 255
(1980),  for which I was assigned responsibility for drafting the position of the United
States as amicus curiae. Since then, I have had the opportunity to represent the fed-
eral government, state and local governments,  and environmental groups in a host of
cases  before  the Supreme Court.
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This  lecture  stems  from  that  work  by  examining  the  Supreme
Court's  role  in  environmental  law's  evolution  during  the  past
thirty years, as reflected in the Court's decisions and the votes of
the individual Justices.  My view is that those decisions and votes
increasingly  suggest  a lack of appreciation  of environmental  law
as a distinct area of law.
This  lecture's  objectives  are  three-fold.  The  first is perhaps
somewhat pedantic, but both revealing  and even entertaining  for
those (like me) who are preoccupied with the Court.  It  is to high-
light some facts and figures about the past thirty years of environ-
mental and natural resources law cases before the Court that tell
much about the Court and the individual Justices.
The second objective is to suggest what the Court's decisions
tell us about the nature and practice of environmental law.  This
includes how environmental law relates to other areas of law with
which it inevitably and repeatedly intersects.  It  also includes les-
sons regarding how, accordingly, law students who seek to become
environmental  lawyers should approach the study of law.  It  like-
wise  extends  to  how  environmental  lawyers  seeking  to  promote
environmental  protection  and  resource  conservation  can  be  the
most effective  in litigation.
The third and final objective is more modest.  It  is to describe
a potentially  significant case that the Court heard during the Oc-
tober 1999  Term.  The case  was important because  at stake was
the future  role  of citizen suit enforcement in environmental  law,
which  has  long  been  one  of  environmental  law's  essential
hallmarks.4  More  broadly,  however,  the case  proved  significant
because it  provided the Court with a much needed opportunity to
reverse the  disturbing trend  discernible  in its  precedent  and to
restore what is "environmental" about environmental  law.
I.  A Scorecard Of The Justices' Votes In Environmental
Cases
Commencing  with the Supreme  Court's  October Term  1969,
the  Court  has  decided  over  240  environmental  and natural  re-
sources  law cases  on  the merits.5  There  are a host of intriguing
4.  See  CITIZEN  SUITS:  AN  ANALYSIS  OF  CITIZEN  ENFORCEMENT  ACTIONS  UNDER
EPA ADMINISTERED  STATUTES  (Environmental Law Institute  1984).
5.  A listing of the cases is included in an appendix  to this article.  Whether a case
is considered "environmental" for the broader purposes  of this threshold inquiry turns
on whether environmental  protection or natural resources matters are at stake.  The
legal issue before the Court need not independently have an environmental character
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factual  inquiries  that could  be undertaken  concerning these rul-
ings.  This lecture, however, focuses on only three: (1) which Jus-
tices wrote the most decisions for the Court during the past thirty
years;  (2) which Justices  have been in the majority the most fre-
quently; and (3)  which Justices  have tended to vote for outcomes
that are more rather than less protective of the environment, and
which Justices have tended to do the converse (that is, less rather
than more).
A.  Justice  White: The Justice Who Wrote the  Most
Environmental  Decisions  For the Court
In tallying which Justice has written the most environmental
opinions  for the  Court  during the  past thirty  years,  one  might
fairly  anticipate that the  opinions  would be split roughly  evenly
with  Chief Justice  Rehnquist  leading  the  pack.  After  all,  the
Chief Justice  has  served  longer  on  the Court than  anyone  pres-
ently there and his tenure virtually spans  the relevant  time  pe-
riod, with his joining the Court as a Justice in 1971.  But it  is in
fact  neither the  Chief Justice  leading the  pack nor  is  it  even  a
close question as to who has written the most environmental opin-
ions  for the Court.  Nineteen  Justices have  served  on the  Court
during the relevant time period6  and Justice White, who left the
Court in  1993,  is  the leading  opinion writer for  the Court  by  a
large margin.
Justice White  wrote  thirty-six  opinions.  The next closest  is
Justice O'Connor with twenty-two  opinions for the Court.  How is
that  revealing?  What  philosophy  does  one  think  about  Justice
White and environmental  protection?  The fairest answer is none
at all.
Justice White harbored no particular interest in environmen-
tal law.  His opinions are dispassionate,  dry, formalistic, with lit-
tle effort to elaborate any particular philosophical vision.  In this
respect,  moreover,  his  environmental  law  opinions  do not  differ
from his opinions  for the  Court generally, which  a recent biogra-
to it.  The stakes themselves  are sufficient  to invoke the label.  The Garrison lecture
upon which this  article is based  was delivered  on March  11,  1999.  Since  then, the
Supreme  Court has decided two additional environmental  cases, City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624  (1999), and Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute
Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719 (1999),  which have been added to the database and, when rele-
vant, to the discussion in the text of this article.
6.  These  Justices  are:  Harlan, Black, Douglas,  Stewart, Brennan, White,  Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor,  Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,  Thomas, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, and there have been two Chief Justices, Burger and Rehnquist.
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phy describes  as evidencing little "elaboration of philosophical  vi-
sion"7 and "never aspiring beyond plain, workmanlike prose."8
Justice White's  controlling philosophy (or lack thereof) is ex-
emplified  by  his  votes  in  three  cases  during  the  1986  October
Term. The Supreme  Court during that term handed down the so-
called  "Takings  Trilogy,"  three  cases  raising  Fifth  Amendment
regulatory  takings challenges  to environmental restrictions:  Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 9 First  English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.  County of Los Angeles,10
and Nollan v.  California  Coastal  Commission.  11  The juxtaposition
of these three cases presented a true jurisprudential paradox  and
certainly  no  readily  discernible,  coherent  view  of the  Takings
Clause.12
Nor do White's  opinions for the Court otherwise suggest any
distinct vision of the role of law in environmental protection.  The
Official  Papers  of Justice  Thurgood  Marshall  provide  another
clear  example.  In Chemical Manufacturers  Ass'n v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.  ,13 Justice White wrote for the Court's
slim  five-Justice  majority  an  opinion  that  upheld  the  United
States  Environmental  Protection  Agency's (EPA) construction  of
the Clean Water Act.  As disclosed by the Marshall  Papers,  how-
ever, he did so only after concluding that there is "little or no dif-
ference  in principle"  between  the  opposing  arguments  and that
"administrative law will not be measurably  advanced or set back
however this case is decided."14  White did not see the case, which-
ever way it  was decided, as being of significant import.  The case
presented  only  a  narrow,  fact-bound  issue  regarding  the  suffi-
ciency of an administrative  record.
7.  DENNIS  HUTCHINSON,  THE  MAN  WHO  ONCE  WAS  WIZZER  WHITE  451  (1998)
(quoting Kate Stith, Byron White: Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19,  n.1
(1993)).
8.  Id. at 454.
9.  480 U.S.  470 (1987).
10.  482 U.S.  304 (1987).
11.  483 U.S.  825 (1987).
12.  See Frank Michelman,  Takings, 1987, 88  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1600,  1625  (1988).
13.  470 U.S.  116  (1985).
14.  Letter  from  Justice  Byron  R.  White  to  The  Chief Justice,  Re:  83-1013  -
Chemical  Manufacturers  Ass'n v. NRDC  (November  13,  1984) (Official  Papers of the
Chambers of Justice Thurgood Marshall).
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B.  Justice Kennedy:  The Justice Most  Often in the Majority in
Environmental  Cases
Another  revealing  factual  inquiry  concerns  the  frequency
with which individual  Justices  were  in the majority  in environ-
mental cases during the past thirty years.  Not surprisingly, Jus-
tice White's  percentage  for being in the majority is very high; he
voted with the majority 89.2 percent of the time.  His being in the
majority so  often may also  provide a neutral explanation for why
White authored  so many  opinions  for the Court.  But opportuni-
ties and opinions  do not necessarily  go hand-in-hand.  Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger,  for instance,  had an even higher  percentage
for being in the majority and wrote far fewer opinions.  The Chief
Justice was  in the majority in over  91.5  percent of the  140 envi-
ronmental cases in which he participated.  Yet he wrote only eight
opinions  for the Court.
The most telling fact about the tendency of Justices to vote in
the majority, however, does not relate to either Chief Justice Bur-
ger or to Justice White.  The Justice with the most astounding rec-
ord  for  being  in the majority  is  Justice  Kennedy.  Kennedy  has
participated  in fifty-seven  cases  to date.  Other than  an original
action of interstate water dispute,15 he has dissented only once, in
Pennsylvania  v.  Union Gas Co.1 6  The Court, moreover, has since
overruled its eleventh amendment decision in Union Gas.17  So, in
effect,  Justice Kennedy's  record  is virtually  100  percent (putting
aside  a couple of somewhat qualified concurring  opinions).' 8
But how  many  opinions  for the  Court has Justice  Kennedy
written?  One might expect as many as ten but certainly no fewer
than six.  But, in fact, until the Court's most recent term, Kennedy
had written only two opinions for the Court.19  He added two more
this past Term.20  Kennedy  supplied, moreover, the deciding fifth
vote in three out of those four cases.
15.  See Oklahoma v. New Mexico,  501  U.S. 221 (1991).
16.  491 U.S.  1 (1989).
17.  See Seminole Tribe  of Florida v. Florida,  517 U.S. 44 (1996).
18.  During the October 1991 Term, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which also joined Justice Scalia's
majority opinion with some qualifications, and a concurring opinion in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Commission,  505  U.S.  1003  (1992),  which  joined  only  in  the
judgment.
19.  See C & A Carbone,  Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994);  Idaho v.
Coeur  d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S.  261 (1997).
20.  The third and fourth cases were both decided after the formal presentation of
the Garrison lecture this past March.  See  City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,  119
[Vol.  17
6 http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss1/1LECTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW
This is a striking result.  The most significant vote has little
direct expression in the Court's opinion writing.  Justice Kennedy
is the key to the majority in environmental protection and natural
resources law cases  today. Yet he almost never writes an opinion
for the Court on these issues.
The  upshot is  the  exacerbation  of the  Court's  longstanding
lack of environmental voice.  Justice White, who wrote most of the
opinions, did not provide it.  Justice Kennedy, who now appears  to
reflect the controlling philosophy for the Court in these cases, has
similarly not yet  expressed  an  overarching  view of the  environ-
mental law field.  He has instead, like White during the 1970s and
1980s,  simply joined opinions that, because they are the products
of shifting  majority  coalitions,  lack  any  consistent  or  coherent
theme.
C.  Justice Douglas vs. Justice Scalia:  Scoring the Justices on
Environmental Protection
The  last categorical  inquiry  concerns  the voting patterns  of
individual Justices based on the relationship of their votes to envi-
ronmental protection objectives.  When do their votes promote en-
vironmental  protection?  And  when  do  their  votes  appear  to
undercut it?
Most Court observers' intuitions regarding the Justices would
likely  be  that  those  Justices  who  are  considered  "liberal" cast
votes  in favor  of environmental  protection  concerns,  while  those
more  "conservative" members  of the Court  do not.  To test that
hypothesis,  I  undertook two detailed  analyses  of the votes of the
Justices:  one more qualitative  and the other striving to be quanti-
tative.  Interestingly, the more qualitative analysis questions the
intuitive  view,  while  the  more  quantitative  approach  restores
some of its force.  Each is discussed next.
1.  What is most immediately suggested by an admittedly un-
scientific, impressionistic review of the votes of individual Justices
in environmental cases is the wholly paradoxical nature of the vot-
ing patterns if assessed exclusively from an environmental protec-
tion perspective. 21  The votes  of a  few Justices  in selected  cases
are illustrative.
S.  Ct.  1624  (1999);  Amoco  Production  Co.  v.  Southern  Ute  Tribe,  119  S.  Ct.  1719
(1999).
21.  My  conclusions in this single respect are strikingly similar to those drawn by
Professor Sive, based on his review in 1994 of the Supreme Court's environmental law
rulings in the October  1993  Term.  Remarking upon the odd voting patterns of indi-
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, for instance, has a reputation in the
environmental  community  for  being  unsympathetic  to  environ-
mental protection concerns.  There are his votes against more  ex-
pansive federal reserved water rights in national forests in United
States v. New Mexico;22 against enhanced procedural rights for en-
vironmentalists in Vermont Yankee Nuclear  Power Corp. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc.;23 against  endangered species
protection in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill; 24 and in favor of a
more  aggressive  regulatory  takings test in both Penn Central v.
City  of  New  York 25  and  Keystone  Bituminous  Coal Ass'n  v.
DeBenedictis.
26
Labeling the Chief Justice  as  somehow "anti-environmental"
is problematic  because many of his votes support environmental-
ist causes.  He voted to uphold environmental criminal convictions
in  United States  v.  Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.;27
supported  the  validity of stricter  local  noise  controls  in  City of
Burbank v.  Lockheed Air Terminal; 28  concluded that  federal  in-
stallations  must comply with state air pollution  control  require-
ments in Hancock v.  Train29  and joined the dissenters  in Japan
Whaling Ass'n v.  American Cetacean Society30  in contending that
the U.S.  Secretary of Commerce was required to certify Japan for
failing to comply with International Whaling Convention whaling
quotas.  Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in a
series  of Dormant Commerce  Clause cases  stress the importance
of the environmental protection goals as an affirmative reason for
upholding the challenged  governmental  action.31
Similar crisscrossing  tendencies  are  evident  in the  votes  of
Justice Stevens, who is generally considered  sympathetic to envi-
vidual Justices  in those  cases, Professor  Sive characterized  environmental  cases  as
making for "strange judicial bedfellows" that Term. See David Sive & Daniel Riesel,
An Analysis of the Justices' Positions  in Environmental Cases Demonstrates that Doc-
trinal Classifications  Aren't Very  Useful, NAT'L L.J.,  October 3,  1994,  at B5.
22.  438  U.S. 696 (1978).
23.  435  U.S. 519 (1978).
24.  437 U.S.  153,  211 (1978)  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25.  438 U.S.  104,  138 (1978)  (Rehnquist, J.,  dissenting).
26.  480  U.S. 470,  506 (1987)  (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
27.  411  U.S. 655,  676 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28.  411  U.S.  624,  640 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29.  426 U.S.  167,  199 (1976)  (Rehnquist, J.,  dissenting).
30.  478  U.S. 221,  241 (1986)  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31.  See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437  U.S. 617, 629  (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992)  (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting),  Oregon  Waste Systems v.  Oregon,  511  U.S. 93,  108  (1992)  (Rehn-
quist, C.J.,  dissenting).
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ronmental protection  concerns.  Stevens'  opinions,  widely  hailed
by  the  environmental  community,  include  his  opinion  for  the
Court  in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n,32  and  his dissents  in
Nollan v.  California  Coastal Commission,33 Lucas v.  South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 34  Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo,35 and Sec-
retary of the Interior  v.  California. 36
But environmentalists  do  not similarly  acclaim  Stevens'  dis-
sents  in California Coastal Comm'n  v.  Granite Rock, 37  favoring
preemption  of state environmental regulation of mining activities
on federal land; in Penn Central, against the constitutionality of a
state  historic  landmark  designation  challenged  as  a  regulatory
taking;38  and in Environmental  Defense Fund  v.  City of Chicago,39
rejecting the Environmental Defense Fund's claim that an exemp-
tion  from a federal hazardous  waste  statute  should be  narrowly
read.  Several of Stevens' votes  against positions favored by envi-
ronmentalists supplied the critical fifth vote for the majority's ad-
verse ruling, including United States v. New Mexico,40  Industrial
Union v. American Petroleum, 41  and Japan Whaling Ass'n.42
For  almost  all  of the Justices,  a  similar pattern  is  evident.
Whatever the particular Justice's reputation, significant counter-
examples are available.  Whether it is Justice Brennan, authoring
the environmentalist's  nightmare  of a dissent in San Diego Gas
Electric v.  City of San Diego,43  which  subsequently  became  the
Court's holding in First  English Evangelical Church v.  County of
Los Angeles,44  or Justice O'Connor, dissenting in First English, 45
and  in  Chemical Manufacturers  Ass'n  v.  Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.,46  in which she  supported  NRDC's more  envi-
32.  480 U.S.  470 (1987).
33.  483 U.S.  825,  866 (1987)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34.  505 U.S.  1003,  1061 (1992)  (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).
35.  456 U.S.  305,  322 (1982)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36.  464  U.S. 312,  344 (1984)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37.  480 U.S.  572,  594 (1987)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38.  438 U.S.  104,  138  (1978)  (Rehnquist, Burger, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
39.  511 U.S.  328,  340 (1994)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40.  438 U.S.  696 (1978).
41.  448 U.S.  607 (1980).
42.  478 U.S.  221 (1986).
43.  450 U.S.  621, 636  (1981)  (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44.  482 U.S.  304 (1987).
45.  See  id.  at  322  (O'Connor,  J.,  joining  in  part,  Stevens  &  Blackmun,  JJ.,
dissenting).
46.  470 U.S.  116,  165  (1985).
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ronmentally  protective  reading  of the  Clean  Water  Act,  while
Justice Brennan did not.47
2.  A more  quantitative  approach  to the Justices' voting sug-
gests,  however,  some discernible  patterns  and tendencies  in the
votes  of the  Justices  in  environmental  cases.  These  tendencies
may or may not be sufficiently strong to suggest a correlation be-
tween the votes and overarching labels  such as "conservative"  or
"liberal." But, in either event, they strongly suggest that, at least
for some justices, the environmental  dimension of the case is rele-
vant to how the Justice casts his or her vote  in that case.
The objective of this analysis is to construct a scoring system
somewhat reminiscent of that employed by the League of Conser-
vation  Voters  Test in scoring  members  of Congress  on environ-
mental matters.48  Here, however, it  is applied to the Justices.  A
Justice  is awarded  one  point  for each  pro-environmental  protec-
tion outcome for which the Justice voted.  The final score, referred
to as an "EP score," is based on the percentage of pro-environmen-
tal votes the Justice cast, out of those cases in which that Justice
participated.  For the purposes  of calculating this score, the entire
database of 243 cases is not used.  The scores  are instead based on
a subset of approximately  100 cases, representing those cases that
are more  susceptible to being assigned a pro-environmental  posi-
tion.49  An EP score of 100 means that a Justice voted for the envi-
ronmentally-protective  outcome  in  all  the  cases  in  which  she
participated.  A score of zero means that the Justice voted for that
environmental  outcome in none of the cases.
With regard to those Justices who were the most environmen-
tally-protective,  the  scores  are  both  easy  and  not  surprising  in
their results.50  The highest  score went  to  Justice  Douglas,  who
47.  Justice  Brennan  joined  Justice  White's  majority  opinion,  supplying  the
needed fifth vote for EPA and against  NRDC.  See id. at  116.
48.  See  League of Conservation  Voters,  League of Conservation Voters National
Environmental Scorecard (visited  May  28,  1999)  <http://www.lcv.org/scorecards/
index.htm>.
.49.  The cases upon which the EP Scores are based are those listed in italics in the
appendix.
50.  The EP scores  for the nineteen  Justices who have served on the Court since
October  Term  1969  are Chief Justice Burger  (34.3),  Justices Black  (75),  Blackmun
(50.3),  Brennan (58.5),  Breyer  (66.6),  Douglas (100),  Ginsburg (63.6), Harlan  (33.3),
Kennedy (25.9), Marshall (61.3), O'Connor (30.4), Powell (30), Chief Justice Rehnquist
(36.5),  Scalia (13.8),  Souter  (57.1),  Stevens  (50.6),  Stewart  (42.6), Thomas  (20), and
White (36.3).  For a full description of the database upon which the EP analysis was
performed, see Richard J.  Lazarus, Restoring What's "Environmental"About  Environ-
mental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A.  L. Rev. 703  (2000).
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scored  100.  Justice Douglas may well be the only environmental
Justice  ever  on  the  Court,  at  least  in  modern  times.  Notwith-
standing his high profile, Justice Douglas was, as a practical mat-
ter, barely there for modern environmental  law.  He was  off the
Court by 1975, and plagued by serious health problems during his
final time on the Court.  As a result, he voted in only fifteen of the
100 cases surveyed for the EP Score.
The highest EP scores for those Justices serving on the Court
for substantial time are those of Justices Brennan (58.5), Marshall
(61.3) and Stevens (50.6).51  Each of their scores, however, is much
lower than  Douglas'  score.  None  of these  other  scores  is  suffi-
ciently high to suggest that the environmental  protection  dimen-
sion of the various cases before the Court was a factor influencing
their respective votes.
The EP scoring analysis further identifies more Justices with
potentially revealing  EP scores  on the low end,  suggesting  some
possible  skepticism,  or perhaps  even  hostility,  towards  environ-
mental protection concerns  or the kind of legal regime such  con-
cerns  promote.  There  are many  EP scores  below  thirty-three,  a
number below thirty, and two below twenty-five.  As with the high
EP scores, there is a hands-down winner, though no score of zero
to equal Justice Douglas' score of 100.  And, as with Justice Doug-
las, there  are no surprises at the lowest of the low end.
The  low score  goes to Justice  Scalia with  a  score just below
fourteen, which is strikingly low.  It  is a score so low that one can
fairly posit that Justice Scalia perceives  environmental protection
concerns  as  promoting  a  set  of legal  rules  antithetical  to that
which he favors.  Indeed, the kind of legal system promoted by en-
vironmental  law  seems  to  be  of sufficient  concern  that  it  even
prompts Justice  Scalia  sometimes  to  abandon  his views  on core
matters involving constitutional  and statutory interpretation. 52
51.  Although the cases upon which the EP scores are based appear in the appen-
dix, infra, the full related  database, including the voting breakdown in each  of those
cases,  the case  topic,  the identity  of the legal  position  in each case  that received  a
point, and the final EP scores  of each of the Justices, is not separately published here
because of its substantial length. It instead appears in Richard J.  Lazarus, Restoring
What's "Environmental"About  Environmental Law in the Supreme Court,  47 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev.  703 (2000).
52.  Justice  Scalia's  opinion  for  the  Court  in  Lucas v.  South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003,  1028 (1992),  embracing an interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment based on "our constitutional culture," and his dissenting opinion in Public Util-
ity District  No.  1  v.  Washington Department of Ecology, 511  U.S.  700,  724  (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), reaching for a construction of the Clean Water Act favored by
industry, are illustrative. See 511 U.S. at 723  (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While I agree
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What about  Kennedy, the Court's current bellwether Justice
who  has been  in  the  majority  in virtually  every  environmental
case before the Court since he joined the bench?  His score is just
below twenty-six,  which  is the third lowest out of nineteen Jus-
tices over the past thirty years.  Although Justice Kennedy's score
may well mask  some  significant  potential  for  a  future shift,53  it
should be unsettling for environmentalists  to learn that a score of
twenty-six represents the Court's current point of equilibrium.
3.  Finally, viewed over time, the EP scores of the Justices in-
dicate that the Court as a whole is steadily becoming less respon-
sive to environmental  protection.  Indeed, the overall shift in the
fate of environmental  protection before the Court during the past
three decades is telling.54  In  1975, there were no Justices sitting
on the Court with scores below thirty.  Today, there are three with
scores of thirty or below  (Kennedy, Scalia,  and Thomas)  and two
with scores  of twenty or below (Scalia and Thomas).55
II.  The Supreme  Court's Apathy and Possible Antipathy
Towards  Environmental  Protection:  Lessons for the
Current and Future Environmental  Lawyer
The overall trends suggest a troubling result for those looking
to the Court to have an affirmative interest in promoting environ-
mental protection.  Environmental protection concerns implicated
fully with the thorough  analysis in the Court's  opinion,  I add  this comment for em-
phasis. For judges who  find it unnecessary  to  go behind the statutory text to discern
the intent  of Congress, this is (or should be) an easy  case.").
53.  Although Justice Kennedy's writing in the area remains sparse, he filed con-
curring opinions in three  cases in which  he expressed  views that create at least the
theoretical possibility of his breaking away from Justice Scalia's approach.  See Lucas
v. South Carolina  Coastal Council, 505 U.S.  at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lujan
v.  Defenders of Wildlife,  504  U.S.  at  579 (Kennedy,  J.,  concurring); Eastern Enter-
prises v.  Apfel,  118 S.  Ct. 2131,  2154 (1998)  (Kennedy, J., concurring).  See Richard
Lazarus,  Balance May Shift Against Scalia, ENVT'L  FORUM  8 (May/June  1999).
54.  These  comparisons  are  based on the Justices' EP  scores  for  their entire ca-
reers and not their EP scores as of the precise date to which the text refers.  A refer-
ence to the EP scores of the Justices in 1975, therefore, considers the career EP scores
of all the Justices  who were  serving  on the  Court in  1975,  which  will include  their
votes before  and  after  1975.  The  1975  date  simply determines  the identity  of the
relevant Justices and does  not confine the database with regard to precedent for pur-
poses  of calculating EP scores.
55.  One must be careful, however, about too quickly equating the votes of individ-
ual Justices  with Court rulings.  The two  do not necessarily  correlate.  For instance,
forty  environmentally  favorable  votes  could  reflect  five  unanimous  rulings  or nine
five/four rulings. For that same reason, thirty environmentally  favorable votes could
reflect six  favorable  Court  rulings  and,  therefore,  more than  forty environmentally
favorable votes.
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by a case  appear, at best, to play no favored role  in shaping the
outcome.  But nor does the outcome seem wholly neutral or indif-
ferent to the presence  of those concerns.
Over  the past  three  decades,  environmental  protection  con-
cerns seem increasingly to be serving a disfavored role in influenc-
ing the Court's outcome.  The preferred outcome is one that places
less, rather than  more, weight  on the  need  to promote  environ-
mental protection.  The Court's decisions, and the attitudes of the
individual Justices, reflect increasing skepticism of the efficacy  of
environmental  protection  goals  and  the  various  laws  that  seek
their promotion.  This analysis leads to two significant conclusions
worth further analysis.
The first conclusion relates  to the relative absence of any no-
tion, for most of the Justices  during the past three decades,  that
environmental law  is a distinct area  of law, as  opposed  to just a
collection  of legal issues incidentally  arising in a factual setting
where  environmental  protection  concerns  are  what  is  at  stake.
The Court's opinions lack any distinct environmental  voice.  Miss-
ing is any emphasis on the nature or character  of environmental
protection  concerns  and  their import  for judicial  construction  of
relevant legal rules.  The Court's decisions in TVA  v. Hill,56 City of
Chicago v.  Environmental Defense Fund, 5 7  and Babbitt v.  Sweet
Home Chapter  of Communities for a Great Oregon,58 all represent
significant, albeit rare, victories for environmental concerns in the
Supreme Court.  In none  of those rulings, however,  do those  con-
cerns play an explicit positive role, if any, in the Court's analysis.
Imagine,  however, if Justice Douglas  were on  the Court and
writing  any  of the  Court's  opinions  in  those  three  cases.  The
Court's rhetoric regarding environmental  protection and its legal
relevance  would be  far  different.  Recall his  genuine  passion  in
dissenting  in Sierra Club  v.  Morton,59  in favor  of expansive  no-
tions of legal standing on behalf of "inarticulate members  of the
ecological  group" (e.g. animals) where  he argued in favor  of legal
doctrine providing  a voice  in court "all of the forms  of life  ...  the
pileated woodpecker  as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmings
as well as the trout in the streams."60  Or consider Justice Black's
emotional  dissent  in San Antonio Conservation Society  v.  Texas
56.  437  U.S. 153  (1978).
57.  511 U.S. 328 (1994).
58.  515 U.S. 687  (1995).
59.  405 U.S.  727,  741  (1972)  (Douglas, J.,  dissenting).
60.  Id. at 752.
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Highway Commission, 6 1 in which he decried cars "spew[ing] forth
air and noise pollution,"62 he warned of mothers  "grow[ing]  anx-
ious..,  lest their children be crushed beneath the massive wheels
of interstate  trucks,"63  and he  described  environmental  laws  as
safeguarding  "our Nation's  well-being  and  our  very  survival."64
Such  emotion  has  meaning  when  it  comes  from  the  Supreme
Court.
For most  of the  Court, most of the  time, environmental  law
has become no more than a subspecies of administrative  law, rais-
ing no special issues or concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a
substantive  area of law.  Environmental  protection is  merely an
incidental context for resolution of a legal question.  Recall again
Justice White's  decision to  side with  EPA in Chemical Manufac-
turers Ass'n  v.  NRDC,65  upholding  the validity  of variances  for
technology-based  standards otherwise  applicable to discharges  of
toxic effluent.  He stressed in his note to Justice Marshall that res-
olution of the case did not make much of a difference  to adminis-
trative law one way or the other.66
What are the practical implications of the Court's approach to
environmental  law  for  someone wanting to be an environmental
lawyer,  or  a lawyer  concerned  about  environmental  protection?
First, to  be  an  outstanding  environmental  lawyer requires  your
being an  excellent  lawyer.  That means  a law  student  zealously
pursuing a career  in environmental  law should  not just concen-
trate on taking "environmental law" classes.  Master the "wilder-
ness"  of  administrative  law.67  Delve  into  the  complexities  of
federal  courts  and federal jurisdiction  - likely the  most impor-
tant course many environmental  public interest litigators take  in
law  school.  Similarly,  approach courses  in corporations,  tax, se-
curities, and real estate law. More  often than not, the fate of the
environmental interests will turn on the resolution of legal issues
rooted  deeply in these other areas of law.
Likewise,  as legal counsel,  do  not approach  cases  with envi-
ronmental blinders  on.  Be ready to  see and understand the case
or  controversy  in  its  broader  legal  context.  And  be  ready  to
61.  400 U.S. 968 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
62.  Id. at 969.
63.  Id.
64.  Id. at 971.
65.  470 U.S.  116 (1985).
66.  See supra note 15,  and accompanying  text.
67.  See David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental  Lawyer in the Wilderness
of Administrative Law,  70 COLUM.  L. REV.  612 (1970).
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master that broader legal context.  Do not just read environmental
cases.  An environmental  lawyer is likely to find the most impor-
tant, most  relevant  precedent  elsewhere,  precisely  because  it  is
elsewhere.
68
Indeed, because of environmental protection's apparent disfa-
vored  status,  the precedent  most  supportive  of an  environmen-
tally-protective  outcome  frequently  can be  found  in cases  where
the favorable  implications  for environmental  protection  concerns
are not at all immediately obvious.  The challenge  of the environ-
mental lawyer is to discover and exploit (and, when necessary, dis-
tinguish)  that  potentially  relevant  precedent.  It  may  be  in
nonenvironmental standing cases such as the Supreme Court's re-
cent  decision  in Federal Election Commission v.  Akins, 69 which
supports broadened standing in environmental cases involving in-
formation reporting requirements;70 or nonenvironmental  regula-
tory takings cases such as Eastern  Enterprises  v. Apfel, 71 in which
Justice Kennedy  advances  a more restricted  approach  to regula-
tory  takings  doctrine  that  could  aid  environmental  regulators
faced with such constitutional  challenges.72
The second  closely related lesson for the environmental  law-
yer is the importance of being strategic in framing and presenting
environmental cases in litigation.  An environmental lawyer, espe-
cially  one representing interests that support enhanced  environ-
mental protection  measures,  should  not  mistake her  motivation
and interest in the case  for what is likely to prompt  a favorable
outcome in an administrative or judicial setting.  The environmen-
tal lawyer must be open to the possibility that it may not be in her
client's strategic interest to emphasize the environmental protec-
tion dimensions  of the case at all.
68.  For example, the Supreme Court's ruling this past Term in Saenz v. Roe,  119
S. Ct. 1518 (1999),  resurrecting the Fourteenth Amendment's Privilege  and Immuni-
ties  Clause  to strike down  California's  cap  on welfare  payments  for  new residents,
may well trigger a new wave of constitutional challenges brought by property owners
against  environmental  regulators  based  on that same  Clause.  See  Carrie Johnson,
The Road to Saenz v.  Roe, 22  THE  LEGAL TimEs  1,  May 24,  1999; Clint  Bolick, Back
from  the Grave - The Supreme Court Exhumes  the 14th Amendment's 'Privileges  or
Immunities' Clause, 22  THE LEGAL  TIMES  19,  May  17,  1999.
69.  524 U.S.  11 (1998).
70.  See  Cass Sunstein, Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins  and Be-
yond,  147 U. PA.  L. REv.  613, 614-15,  621-24, 651-52,  663-67,  667-69  (1999).
71.  524 U.S. 498,  539-47 (1998).
72.  See 524 U.S. 498,  539 (1998)  (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Richard  Lazarus, Balance May Shift Against Scalia, ENV'L  FORUM  8  (May/
June  1999).
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An  advocate  needs, of course,  to focus  the  decisionmaker  on
her best legal or policy arguments.  Those that the advocate cares
about,  however,  may  not  be  those  likely  to  motivate  the  deci-
sionmaker towards the preferred  outcome.  Like any good lawyer,
the environmental  lawyer needs to identify and address the deci-
sionmaker's concerns,  and not make the mistake of assuming that
she shares the advocate's  own.
The current Court is, at the very least, not a Court comprised
of Justices looking at cases as  "environmental law" cases.  Other
crosscutting issues are more likely to influence their votes  rather
than the environmental protection implications  of one result over
another.  What  the Justices  believe,  for instance,  should  be the
relationship between  courts  and administrative  agencies  regard-
ing matters of statutory construction, or, the relationship between
states and the federal government in their respective  areas of law-
making.  The Justices strive for consistency on these  crosscutting
issues that apply in a variety of contexts, of which environmental
law seems to be just one of many.
Different  cases  therefore  require  different  strategies.  For
Justice Scalia, it may well be to turn the case into a plain meaning
case, or  a nonlegislative history  case.73  Indeed,  for Scalia, there
may well  be reason not to emphasize  the positive environmental
protection implications of the side that you are promoting.  For the
Chief Justice, it  may well  be to  emphasize judicial integrity con-
cerns,  including  the  autonomy  of trial  courts,  the  costs  of frag-
mented  litigation,  premature  judicial  decision  making,  and
possible burdens  on the federal judiciary.74  For Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor, it may well be the federalism implications of a par-
ticular outcome, stare decisis, concerns with judicial activism, and
the sheer inequities  of a particular result.
73.  See, e.g., City of Chicago  v. Environmental  Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994);
Richard J.  Lazarus & Claudia  M. Newman,  City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund: Searching  for Plain  Meaning in Unambiguous  Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL.  L.J.
1, 15-19  (1995).
74.  The Chief Justice's  concerns  with  preserving  state  sovereignty  in the  Dor-
mant Commerce Clause cases is one obvious example. See notes 23 to 32, supra, and
accompanying text.  Similar concerns  seem to temper Rehnquist's views on the regu-
latory takings issue.  See  Richard J.  Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting  Hold-
ings in the Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Cases, 38 WM.  & MARY L.  REV.  1099,
1111-14 (1996);  Letter from Justice William  H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Re: Agins v.  City of Tiburon (May 29,  1980) (Official  Papers  of the Chambers  of
Justice Thurgood  Marshall)  ("I am somewhat uneasy  about the latitude which your
treatment  of federal constitutional review of local  zoning ordinances  on pages 5 and 6
of your present draft appears  to give  federal courts.").  Id.
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The  more  fundamental  issue  is  whether,  regardless  of the
strategic advantages  of thinking outside the "environmental" box
in environmental  litigation, such a stripping of the "environment"
out of environmental  law is a positive or appropriate  development
for  environmental  law.  My  short  answer  is  the law  professor's
classic "yes and no."  Some stripping is appropriate, but not to the
extent that has occurred in the Supreme  Court.
Why is it partially appropriate?  Simply because the Justices'
natural instinct about environmental law is partially correct:  en-
vironmental law does not exist in a vacuum.  Environmental  law
issues  do arise  in  contexts  that implicate  other, very  important
crosscutting  areas  of law,  such as  administrative  law,  corporate
law, Tenth Amendment law, Fifth Amendment  law, and criminal
law.
Nor  is  it  happenstance  that  environmental  law  constantly
arises in these other contexts.  So many different kinds  of activi-
ties implicate environmental protection concerns that the legal re-
quirements  serving  that  end  must  necessarily  be  widely
applicable.  Those legal requirements  also necessarily  create fric-
tion  by restriking  balances  previously  reached  by  other  pre-ex-
isting  legal  rules  governing  that  same  activity.  By  promoting
rapid change in the law in response  to increased  public demands
for  environmental  protection,  environmental  law  necessarily
places  great  pressure  on lawmaking  institutions  and  generates
conflicts  between  competing  lawmaking  fora,  between  sovereign
authorities  (local,  state, tribal  and  federal)  and within their  re-
spective  executive, judicial, and legislative branches.
The Justices' focus in the first instance on these crosscutting
issues is also quite proper.  The Justices  should strive for consis-
tency in their resolution.  There should not always be one answer
if environmental protection is at stake; and another answer if not.
Such singularly outcome-dependent judicial reasoning could  seri-
ously undermine the law's essential integrity and legitimacy.
But that is not to say that environmental protection concerns
are irrelevant  when  addressing  those  crosscutting issues.  Such
concerns legitimately inform the judicial resolution of those issues
and sometimes justify striking a new and different balance.  Envi-
ronmental  protection  concerns  need  not always  be  a  dispositive
factor  to be  legitimately so in some instances,  and always  to re-
main  a relevant factor for separate  consideration.
In the  early  1970s,  the  Court  appeared  to  understand  the
broader implications of the nation's commitment to a legal regime
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for environmental  protection.  The Court seemed  to recognize  its
responsibility  to account for the corresponding evolutionary pres-
sures being triggered by that emerging legal regime  on other in-
tersecting  areas  of law  and  on  lawmaking  institutions.  Since
then, the  Court has too  often mistakenly  equated  the judiciary's
involvement with such traditional, legitimate  legal evolution with
the  1980s judicial bugaboo of "judicial activism."
The cost of this mistaken belief is substantial.  The Court de-
prives itself of its ability to consider the sheer importance of envi-
ronmental  protection  to the issues  before  the Court.  Even more
fundamentally,  the  Court  fails  to consider how  the  special  chal-
lenges  that  environmental  protection  presents  may  warrant
evolution in legal  doctrine.75
The Court's treatment of the issue of standing during the past
three decades is emblematic of its attitude towards environmental
law.  The  Court  originally  relaxed  standing  requirements  in re-
sponse  to  the  special  challenges  presented  by  environmental
law.76  The Court  revised the  standing doctrine  in recognition  of
the nature of the injuries at stake in environmental litigation be-
ing  neither clearly  economic  nor  physical.7 7  The  Court  likewise
took  special  account of the inevitable,  uncertain  and speculative
nature of such injuries, in particular, the more attenuated chain of
causation between action and injury.78
In recent years the Court has handed down a series of stand-
ing rulings that fails to consider these challenges and, as a result,
makes it  especially difficult for plaintiff citizens to maintain  envi-
75.  To be sure, one can perceive snippets of environmental  law's influence  in rare,
isolated  opinions of the Justices. Not surprisingly, Justice  Douglas was most apt to
see the relationship.  For  instance, in two cases  in  1972,  Salyer Land Co. v.  Tulare
Lake Basin Water, 410 U.S. 719 (1972)  and Associated Enterprises,  Inc. v.  Toltec Wa-
tershed Improvement, 410 U.S. 743 (1972), the Court ruled that equal protection was
not violated by a  state statute that excluded tenants and permitted only landowners
to vote for candidates for the water storage district and weighed their votes according
to the value of the land each owned.  Justice Douglas perceived the cases differently
than the majority precisely because  he understood the role that water  played in  the
lives and ecosystem of the affected tenants.  See 410 U.S. at 749 ("It is also inconceiv-
able that  a  body with the  power  to destroy  a  river by damming  it  and  so deprive  a
watershed  of one of its  most salient environmental  assets  does  not  have 'sufficient
impact'  on the interests  of people generally  to invoke  the principles of [this Court's
voting rights precedent]").  Id.
76.  See Richard  J. Lazarus,  Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural  Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA  L.  REV.  631,
658-64  (1986).
77.  See Sierra Club v. Morton,  405 U.S. 727,  738 (1972).
78.  See United States v. S.C.R.A.P.,  412 U.S.  669,  685 (1973).
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ronmental  lawsuits.  The  trend  has  been  so  plain  that  it  even
prompted Justice Blackmun to question openly in dissent why the
Court  systematically  disfavored  environmental  plaintiffs  in  the
law of standing.
79
Another  area is the law of regulatory takings.  Here too, the
Court's early case law suggested an appreciation  for how environ-
mental  protection  and  natural  resource  conservation  concerns
might justify a rethinking of the nature of private property rights
in natural resources.80  But, the Court has since seemed more at-
tracted to a view of property that is static, not dynamic, and there-
fore restricts the legislature's constitutional  authority to promote
environmental protection.8'
Standing law and regulatory  takings law are just two  of the
more obvious examples.  The Court's need to consider the lessons
supplied by environmental  law in addressing crosscutting issues
extends to less obvious areas as well, such as corporate law.  Dur-
ing  the  October  1997  Term,  for  instance,  in  United States  v.
Bestfoods, 8 2  the Court faced  the question under  the Comprehen-
sive  Environmental  Response,  Compensation,  and Liability  Act
(CERCLA),83 of the liability of a parent corporation for the actions
of  a  subsidiary.  What  was  striking  about  the  oral  argument
before the Court was that the Justices were uniformly aware and
sympathetic  to the important  policy objectives  underlying  corpo-
rate law's limited liability rules, but were not similarly aware  of
environmental law's competing concerns.  Indeed, members  of the
Court appeared  shocked  to learn  from both  government  and in-
dustry  counsel,  the  undisputed  common  ground  regarding  con-
gressional intent in CERCLA in terms  of corporate liability.8 4
79.  See Lujan v.  Defenders  of Wildlife,  504  U.S.  555,  606 (1992)  (Blackmun,  J.,
dissenting) ("I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition
through the law of environmental standing.") Id. After the presentation of this Gar-
rison lecture  and immediately  before  this  article  went to final  press, the Supreme
Court took an anticipated, yet important, step toward reversing this trend in a ruling
noted later in this article.  See infra, note  108.
80.  See, e.g.,  Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.  590 (1962);  Penn Central
v.  City of New York,  438 U.S.  104 (1978); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51  (1980).
81.  See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.  County of Los
Angeles,  482 U.S. 304 (1987);  Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); Lucas  v. South Carolina  Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);  Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S.  374 (1994).
82.  524 U.S.  51  (1998).
83.  42  U.S.C.  §§ 9601 et seq. (1999).
84.  Official  Transcript  of the Oral Argument before  the United States  Supreme
Court,  United States v.  Bestfoods, No.  97-454,  pp.  16-17,  1998  U.S.  Trans. Lexis  61
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III.  Bringing the "Environment" Back to Environmental
Law:  Friends of the Earth v.  Laidlaw
Environmental Services
The important remaining question is whether existing trends
in  the  Court's  approach  to environmental  law  can  be  changed.
Past  experience  strongly  suggests that the  answer to that ques-
tion  may well  depend  on  both  the  life  experiences  (professional
and  personal)  that  the  current  and  future  Justices  bring  with
them to their work.  It  is no coincidence that the only Justice with
a  significantly  high  EP  Score  (100)  is  Justice  Douglas,  whose
deeply-held  views  favoring environmental  protection  restrictions
find their roots in his life-long involvement with the natural envi-
ronment as an avid hiker and outdoorsman.8 5  No current Justice
has comparable links to the natural environment in general  or to
either resource conservation or environmental  protection matters
more particularly.
8 6
Perhaps the short  answer to the question  of how best to re-
store the "environment" to environmental  law in the Court might
be to find  some way to  provide individual Justices  with personal
experiences that allow them to appreciate  more fully the environ-
mental  stakes  of the cases  before  the  Court.  But  putting aside
such  extra-judicial  influences,  the most viable basis for persuad-
ing the Justices of the need for placing greater weight on the envi-
ronmental dimension of environmental law is going to be through
the facts of the individual cases  brought to the Court's attention.
Each of those  cases presents the Justices with a story about the
way in which laws affect the quality of life.  The cumulative effect
of multiple stories can significantly  affect the way the Justices de-
cide what cases  to hear and  how then to  decide the  legal issues
presented.
To  the  detriment  of environmental  protection  concerns,  the
property rights movement has used this technique with enormous
success.  By bringing to the Court's attention during the past sev-
eral decades a series of cases, the factual allegations of which ap-
pear  to  support  their  claim  of  environmental  regulatory
(March 24, 1998) (argument of Ms. Schiffer, counsel for the United States EPA); id.  at
26-27 (argument of Mr. Geller, counsel  for Bestfoods).
85.  See WILLIAM  0.  DOUGLAS,  Go EAST,  YOUNG  MAN,  203-36 (Delta Pub.  1974).
86.  The only current Justice with such possible strong personal ties to the natural
environment  might be Justice David Souter, based on his reputation as a hiker.  See
David Margolick, Bush's Court Choice: Ascetic at Home But Vigorous on Bench, N.Y.
TIMES,  July 25,  1990, at A1:3.
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overreaching,  such as  claims  of economic  wipe-outs,8 7  or wheel-
chair-bound, blind widows being denied the right to build a dream
home,88  these advocates have successfully fostered a general judi-
cial skepticism about the reasonableness of environmental laws.
It  is, of course,  that same judicial  skepticism that  environ-
mentalists  and  environmental  regulators  must  now  overcome.
Environmentalists  and  environmental  regulators  face  a  conun-
drum.  As previously described, it  is likely often not in their short
term strategic  interests to emphasize  the  environmental  dimen-
sion of a case because of the Court's current skepticism.  But, un-
less environmentalists  begin to tell their own story to the Justices,
they are unlikely to dispel that skepticism in the longer term.  A
simultaneous  accomplishment of those two often conflicting objec-
tives will not be  easy.  It will  require  careful  case  management
and  case  selection  to  bring  to  the Justices'  attention  cases  that
both instruct the Court on the important policies and values safe-
guarded by environmental  protection laws and  explain  how such
safeguarding  is  entirely  consistent  with  our  nation's  legal
traditions.
There is currently at least some reason for optimism that the
Court may be about to take an initial step in the right direction.
The Court has agreed to review  this October  1999 Term a poten-
tially very important environmental  case, Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services. 8 9  The  Fourth Circuit's  ruling
under review in Laidlaw 90  was an absolutely disastrous decision
for environmentalists.  But what  made the lower court ruling so
significant was that it was not so much the product of a mere aber-
rational court of appeals  decision than it was suggestive of the ju-
risprudential  signals that the  Supreme  Court has been  sending
out to the lower  courts  about the  strict application  of Article  III
case or controversy requirements  to  environmental  citizen  suits.
For that same reason, however,  the case provided the Court with
the opportunity  both to embrace the important role Congress  in-
tended for citizen suits to serve in environmental law and to strike
a balance in constitutional Article III doctrine that is more accom-
modating to that congressional  scheme.
87.  Lucas v.  South Carolina Coastal  Council,  505 U.S.  1003,  1009  (1992).
88.  Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,  520 U.S.  725 (1997); see Richard
J.  Lazarus,  Litigating Suitum  v.  Tahoe  Regional  Planning  Agency  in the  United
States Supreme Court, 12  J.  LAND  USE  & ENVTL. L.  179,  184-86 (1997).
89.  525 U.S.  1176  (1999).
90.  Friends  of the Earth v.  Laidlaw  Environmental Services,  149  F.3d 303  (4th
Cir. 1998).
1999]
2122  PACE ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW REVIEW
In Laidlaw, the  plaintiff, Friends  of the  Earth,  brought  a
fairly routine  citizen suit against an industrial  facility owned  by
Laidlaw Environmental  Services  based on hundreds of violations
of Laidlaw's Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System permit, both  by exceeding allowable  mercury  dis-
charges  and  by  violating  monitoring  and  reporting  require-
ments.91  No  Gwaltney92  threshold  jurisdictional  problem  was
presented; no one disputed that the facility was in noncompliance
both  at the time the sixty day-notice and the subsequent lawsuit
was filed.  The trial took several years, however, and by the time
the trial was complete, the company was no  longer in noncompli-
ance.  The district court, accordingly, declined any request for in-
junctive relief, but imposed more than $400,000 in civil penalties,
payable to the U.S. Treasury, and expressly indicated that an at-
torney's fee award would similarly be forthcoming.93
On appeal, however,  the Fourth  Circuit reversed. 94  The  ap-
pellate court held that once the facility came into compliance, the
case became moot.95  No Article III jurisdiction  existed, the court
ruled,  for either a  civil  penalties  award  or for  an attorney's  fee
award.96  The court, accordingly, ordered dismissal of the action in
its entirety, an absolutely dramatic result.  Consider the perverse
incentive the appellate court's reasoning provides  a regulated  fa-
cility.  So long as the facility comes into compliance prior to final
judgment in a citizen suit enforcement  action, a facility that has
long  been  in  violation  of  the  federal  environmental  law,  both
before and after the filing of the complaint,  cannot be subject to
either a civil penalty or an attorney's fee award.  The incentive to
comply  prior  to  suit  is  dramatically  reduced.  Also  sharply  re-
duced, if not wholly eliminated, is the longstanding incentive that
defendants in environmental citizen suits have historically had to
settle their cases.  Such settlements have led to defendants'  pay-
91.  See Friends  of the Earth  v. Laidlaw, 956  F.  Supp. 588, 600-01,  610  (D. S.C.
1997).
92.  In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.  Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S.  49
(1987), the Court held that Clean Water Act citizen suits could not be maintained for
wholly  past violations of that Act.  See id. at 56-63.  A plaintiff need, at a minimum,
set forth in the complaint good faith allegations of violations ongoing at the time that
the complaint is filed. See id. at 64-65.
93.  See 956 F. Supp. at 610-11.
94.  See  149  F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
95.  See id.  at 307.
96.  See id. at 306-07.  The court's attorney's  fee decision was especially remarka-
ble given that the court accompanied its ruling with  a "but see" cite to the Supreme
Court's decision in Gwaltney.  See id. at 307.
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ing  hundreds  of millions  of dollars  to  support  environmentally
beneficial  projects.
97
From a purely historical perspective, the Court's granting cer-
tiorari in Friends  of the Earth was, standing  alone, of surprising
significance.  The  Court  has  heard  almost  250  environmental
cases on the merits during the past thirty years, yet this was only
the second time that the Court granted a citizen suit petition in an
environmental case at the sole request of the citizen plaintiffs.  To
be sure, the Justices have frequently  done so at the behest  of in-
dustry.98  Likewise, they have often granted review at the request
of federal,  state and local governments. 99  But it has been twenty-
seven years  since the Court last granted review  at the exclusive
request of environmental plaintiffs, and that was in Sierra  Club v.
Morton'00  in  1972.
There is  also good  reason  to believe  that the  Court  granted
review in Friends of the Earth to rule in favor of the environmen-
tal plaintiffs.  It takes four votes to grant review and it is unlikely
that the four votes this time came from Justices seeking to affirm
the Fourth Circuit's analysis.  A Justice seeking to make it harder
for environmental plaintiffs to bring suits would not pick this case.
This  is a case presenting  a record  in which the trial court found
97.  See  Comment,  Jeff Ganguly,  Environmental Remediation Through Supple-
mental Environmental Projects and Creative Negotiation: Renewed Community In-
volvement in Federal  Enforcement, 26 B.C. ENVTL.  AFF. L. REV.  189 (1998);  Comment,
Laurie Droughton, Supplemental Environmental  Projects:  A Bargain  for the Environ-
ment,  12  PACE  ENvTL.  L.  REV.  789 (1995).
98.  Two recent examples  include  The Steel Co. v.  Citizens for A Better Environ-
ment,  523 U.S.  83  (1998),  and Bennett v.  Spear, 520  U.S.  154  (1997),  but there  are
many during the past three decades.  See, e.g., Vermont Yankee  Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Baltimore Gas & Electric v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983);
Chevron  v. NRDC,  467  U.S. 837 (1984);  Stringfellow  v. Concerned  Neighbors in Ac-
tion, 480 U.S. 370 (1987); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484
U.S.  49 (1988).
99.  See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979); California v. Sierra Club,
451  U.S.  287  (1981);  Watt  v.  Energy  Action  Education  Foundation,  454  U.S.  151
(1982);  Weinberger  v.  Catholic Action  of Hawaii/Peace  Education  Project, 454  U.S.
139 (1982);  Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711 (1987);  Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens  Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989);  Lujan
v. Defenders  of Wildlife,  504 U.S. 555 (1992).
100.  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).  The closest exception is provided
by Hallstrom v.  Tillamook County, 493 U.S.  20 (1989).  But, in Hallstrom, the Court
granted certiorari (489 U.S. 1077 (1989)) only after asking the Solicitor General of the
United States about the advisability of granting review (see 488 U.S. 811 (1989)) and
then only after the United States filed a brief both advising the Court to hear the case
on  the merits  and to  rule  against  the  environmental  petitioners  (see Brief for  the
United States as  Amicus  Curiae in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, No.  88-42  (filed
February  17,  1989)),  which the Court then did.
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hundreds  of violations occurring  over many years.1 0 1  The viola-
tions,  moreover,  involve  discharges  of mercury;  not  substances
seemingly innocuous to a layperson or to a lay Justice.  Mercury is
a highly toxic subsistence that persists, rather than degrades,  in
the  natural  environment.10 2  The  record  further  shows  that the
district  court  imposed  a  hefty  fine  of  several  hundreds  of
thousands of dollars, after finding that the company had enjoyed
an economic  benefit of over  one million  dollars because  of those
violations.103
A Justice seeking to erect mootness or other Article III barri-
ers to  citizen suit enforcement  would  look for a case  with a very
different  record.  Far preferable  would  be a case  involving  more
seemingly innocuous pollutants,104  in order  to both bolster possi-
ble suggestions of the frivolousness  of the lawsuit and the lack of
necessity for citizen suit enforcement overall.  Finally, no clear cir-
cuit conflict was presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari
because  the Fourth  Circuit relied  upon  a recent  Supreme  Court
ruling, The Steel Co.  v.  Citizens for a Better Environment, not yet
considered  in this identical context by other circuits.
Of course, four votes  do not a majority make.  The necessary
five-vote majority for the environmental plaintiffs in Friends  of the
Earth seems  clearly  in reach,  however,  in light of the Justices'
past voting record.  In particular,  at least two Justices,  Kennedy
and O'Connor,  seem  quite  open  to the  environmental  plaintiffs
contention that the lower court misapplied mootness doctrine.  Ar-
ticle III jurisdictional requirements is an area where both Justices
have written  and/or joined  separate  opinions  that reflect greater
awareness  of the  need for legal doctrine to  evolve  in response  to
the special concerns raised by the demands of environmental pro-
tection.  Justice O'Connor actually dissented in Lujan v. Defenders
101.  See 956 F. Supp. at 600-01.
102.  See  ROBERT  V.  PERCIVAL,  ALAN  S.  MILLER,  CHISTOPHER  H.  SCHROEDER  &
JAMES P. LEAPE,  ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATION  - LAW,  SCIENCE,  &  POLICY 475 (1996).
103.  See  id.  at 610-11,  613.
104.  For example, some in the environmental  community strongly urged the envi-
ronmental  plaintiffs in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v.  Magnesium
Elektron, Inc.,  123  F.3d  111  (3d  Cir.  1997)  not  to  seek  Supreme  Court  review.
Although  environmentalists  were  unanimously  of the view that  the Third  Circuit's
ruling on standing in Magnesium Elektron was very harmful, legally erroneous, and
could  form the basis  of a strong  petition  for  a writ of certiorari,  there was far less
agreement  on  the  essential strategic  inquiry whether  the case  presented  the facts
needed  to make  that legal  argument  in  the  strongest  possible light.  A substantial
proportion  of the  alleged  violations  of the  Clean Water  Act at  issue  involved  dis-
charges  of salt and heat.  See id.  at 115.
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of Wildlife, and joined Blackmun's  opinion, which denounced  the
majority  for  its  "slash  and  burn" of the  law  of environmental
standing.105  Kennedy,  the  current  bellwether  Justice  for deter-
mining the majority ruling,10 6 joined most of the majority opinion
in that same  case,  but he also wrote  separately  to  stress, along
with  Justice  Souter,  how  environmental  protection  concerns
might  justify  Congress'  allowance  of less  concrete  injuries  and
more attenuated chains of causation without offending Article III
of the Constitution. 
1 0 7
Were  both Justices Kennedy  and O'Connor to fashion a ma-
jority with Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg on the
issues before the Court in Friends  of the Earth, the resulting opin-
ion could  begin to restore what makes  environmental  law "envi-
ronmental."  The  Court  could  acknowledge  that  environmental
protection  concerns  warrant rethinking  the way that Article  III
standing and mootness requirements are understood  and applied.
At the very least, the case represents an all-too-rare  opportunity
for the Court to take a positive step in that direction.'08
105.  504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106.  See supra note  16 to 21  and accompanying text.
107.  See 504 U.S. at 580 ("Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains  of causation  that will  give  rise to a case  or  controversy  where  none  existed
before.") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108.  Subsequent events reveal that such a positive step has now been taken.  The
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Friends of the Earth on March  1, 1999 (see
525 U.S.  1176 (1999)),  which was a few  days before the delivery of this Garrison  lec-
ture.  The case  was argued in October  1999, several months  after the written manu-
script for  publication was  complete.  On January  12,  2000, just as this  article  was
going to final press, the Court announced its decision  in the case.  See  Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental  Services, Inc.,  120 S.Ct. 693 (2000).  As  anticipated,
the  Court  rejected  the  Fourth  Circuit's  mootness  ruling.  See  120  S.Ct.  693,  697
(1999).  The Court, moreover, also rejected Laidlaw's  effort to defend the court of ap-
peals' judgment on the alternative ground that Friends of the Earth lacked Article III
standing.  See id.  The Court rejected Laidlaw's contention that a citizen suit plaintiff
must  demonstrate  actual injury to the natural  environment.  The  Court ruled that
injury to the environment is not the relevant  inquiry  for  standing, which should in-
stead be  whether the plaintiff  has  been injured.  According to the Court,  moreover,
Friends of the Earth had established  such injury by establishing that their members'
reasonable concerns  about the possible effects of the unlawful discharges had affected
adversely their  willingness to use the waterway at issue.  See id. at 698.  The Court
further ruled that, because  of their  future deterrent effect,  civil penalties could  pro-
vide sufficient redress for citizen suit standing purposes even when the defendant was
currently  in compliance and those  penalties were payable exclusively to the  federal
treasury.  See id.  The court's opinion departs  significantly from  some of the broader
implications in the Court's recent standing precedent, adverse to environmental  citi-
zen  suit  plaintiffs,  discussed  in this  article's text.  Justice  Ginsburg authored  the
Court's opinion, joined by six others, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens,  O'Connor, Kennedy,  Souter, and  Breyer.  Justice Scalia  filed  a dissenting
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IV.  Conclusion
Bringing the "environment" back to "environmental law" is, of
course, a long and not a short term undertaking.  Even a ruling in
a single case such as Friends  of the Earth  v.  Laidlaw is only that:
a single ruling in a single case.  It  is a far cry from a reversal of the
trend disfavoring environmental protection that is apparent in the
Court's decisions during the past three decades.
Nor will the longer term restoration, now warranted, occur as
a result ultimately  of the efforts of environmental  lawyers of my
generation,  or the efforts  of David Sive, Joe Sax, Bill Rodgers,  or
Ollie Houck.  It  will depend largely on the future efforts of today's
law students, such as those here at Pace and at other law schools,
who are about to embark on  a career in environmental  law.
Environmental lawyers of my generation found inspiration in
the work of those who  came  before  us, including Lloyd  Garrison.
All I can hope for is that today's  law students  include  some who
will find the necessary inspiration in the work of those within my
own generation of environmental lawyers and scholars; that they
will be thoughtful, strategic advocates for environmental law's im-
portant  goals,  and  that  they  will  work  towards  environmental
law's restoration  in our nation's highest court.
opinion, which Justice Thomas joined.  The favorable outcome  in the  Supreme Court
would  seem  to  confirm the wisdom  of the  environmentalist  strategy of not  seeking
review  in earlier cases presenting far less favorable  facts.  See note  105, supra.
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Appendix
Environmental Cases Decided  By The United States
Supreme Court
October Term  1969-October Term  1998
Year
Cite  Name*  Decided
397  U.S. 88  Arkansas  v. Tennessee  1970
397  U.S. 620  Choctaw Nation v.  Oklahoma  1970
400 U.S. 48  Hickel v.  Oil Shale  1970
401 U.S. 402  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.  Volpe  1971
401 U.S. 493  Ohio v.  Wyandotte Chemicals Corp  1971
401  U.S. 520  United States v. District Court in and for the  1971
County of Eagle
401 U.S. 527  United States v. District Court in and for Water  1971
Division No.  5
402 U.S.  159  United States v. Southern Ute Tribe of Band of  1971
Indians
402 U.S. 558  United States v.  International  Minerals & Chemical  1971
Corp.
403 U.S. 9  Utah v. United States  1971
405 U.S. 727  Sierra Club v.  Morton  1972
406 U.S. 91  Illinois v. Milwaukee  1972
406 U.S.  109  Washington v. General  Motors Corp.  1972
406 U.S.  117  Nebraska v. Iowa  1972
409 U.S. 80  United States v. Jim  1972
409 U.S. 470  Farmers Elevator & Warehouse  Co.  v. United  1973
States
410 U.S. 73  EPA v.  Mink  1973
410  U.S. 641  Ohio v. Kentucky  1973
410 U.S. 719  Salyer Land Co. v.  Tulare Lake Basin Water  1973
410 U.S. 743  Associated Enterprises  Inc. v.  Toltec Watershed  1973
Improvement
411 U.S. 325  Askew v. American  Waterway Operators  1973
411  U.S. 624  City of Burbank v. Lockheed  Air Terminal  Inc  1973
411  U.S. 655  United States v.  Pennsylvania  Industrial  Chemical  1973
Corp.
412  U.S. 481  Mattz v. Arnett  1973
412  U.S. 541  Fri v. Sierra Club  1973
412  U.S. 580  United States v. Little Lake Misere  Land Co.  1973
412 U.S.  669  United States v. SCRAP Aberdeen and Rockfish  1973
Railroad Co. v.  SCRAP
414  U.S. 44  Department of Game of the State of Washington  v.  1973
The Puyallup  Tribe
414  U.S. 313  Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona  1973
415 U.S.  289  Mississippi v. Arkansas  1974
416 U.S.  1  Village  of Belle Terre v. Boraas  1974
416 U.S.  861  Air Pollution Variance Board of Colorado  v.  1974
Western Alfalfa Corp
* Italicized case names  are those  used in the "EP" scoring.
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Cite
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
421 U.S.
421 U.S.
422  U.S.
422 U.S.
422 U.S.
424 U.S.
425 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
427 U.S.  246
427 U.S.  390
429 U.S.  363
430 U.S.  112
431 U.S.  99
431 U.S.  265
434 U.S.  275
435 U.S.  151
435 U.S.  519
436 U.S.  371
436 U.S.  604
437 U.S.  153
437 U.S.  617
438 U.S.  59
438 U.S.  104
438 U.S.  645
438 U.S.  696
440 U.S.  391
440 U.S. 668
441  U.S. 322
Name*
Train v.  City of New  York
Train v.  Campaign Clean Water
Antoine  v. Washington
Utah v. United  States
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians  v. Federal  Power
Comm'n Arizona PSC v. Chemehuevi Tribe of
Indians FPC  v. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians
United States v. Maine
United States v. Louisiana
United States v. Florida
Train v.  Natural Resources Defense Council
Alyeska Pipeline  Service Co. v.  The Wilderness
Society
United States v. Louisiana
United States v. Alaska
Aberdeen and Rockfish R.R.  Co. v. SCRAP; United
States v.  SCRAP
Alamo Land & Cattle Co v. State of Arizona
Northern Cheyenne Tribe  v. Hollowbreast
Train v.  Colorado Public Interest Group
Cappaert  v. United States
Hancock v.  Train
EPA v.  California  ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Board
New Hampshire v. Maine
Texas v. Louisiana
Kleppe v.  New Mexico
Flint Ridge Development  Co. v.  Scenic  Rivers
Association
Union Electric Co.  v.  EPA
Kleppe v.  Sierra Club
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis
E  I DuPont de Nemours v.  Train
EPA v.  Brown
Douglas v. Seacoast Prod
Adamo Wrecking Co.  v. United States
Ray v. Atlantic  Richfield Co.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.  NRDC
Baldwin v.  Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana
Andrus v. Charlestone  Stone Prod
TVA  v.  Hill
Philadelphia  v.  New Jersey
Duke Power  Co. v. Carolina  Envt'l Study Grp
Penn Central Transp v.  City of New York
California v. United States
United States v.  New Mexico
Lake Country Estates v.  Tahoe Regional  Planning
Agency
Leo Sheep  Co.  v. United States
Hughes v. Oklahoma
* Italicized case names are those used in the "EP" scoring.
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1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1977
1977
1977
1977
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1979
1979
1979
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Cite
442 U.S. 347
442 U.S. 653
443 U.S.  658
444 U.S. 51
444 U.S.  164
444 U.S.  206
444 U.S.  223
444 U.S. 335
445 U.S.  193
445 U.S.  198
445 U.S. 253
445 U.S. 535
445 U.S.  715
446 U.S. 253
446 U.S. 500
446 U.S. 578
446 U.S. 657
447 U.S.  1
447 U.S.  125
447 U.S. 255
447 U.S. 352
448 U.S. 242
448 U.S. 371
448 U.S. 607
449 U.S. 64
449 U.S. 456
450 U.S. 544
450  U.S. 621
451  U.S. 259
451  U.S. 287
452 U.S. 264
452  U.S. 314
453  U.S.  1
453  U.S. 490
453 U.S.  609
454  U.S. 139
454  U.S.  151
454  U.S. 516
456 U.S.  305
457 U.S.  55
457  U.S. 273
458 U.S.  941
459 U.S.  176
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Name*
Andrus v.  Sierra Club
Wilson v. Omaha  Indian Tribe
Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel
Andrus v.  Allard
Kaiser  Aetna  v.  United States
Vaughn v. Vermilion  Corp
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen;
City of New York  v.  Karlen; Secretary of HUD v.
Karlen
Ohio v. Kentucky
Crown  Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle
Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation
United States v. Clarke
United States v. Mitchell
Andrus v. Idaho
United States v. Louisiana
Andrus v. Utah
Harrison  v. PPG Industries,  Inc.
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co.
United States v. California
California  v.  Nevada
Agins v. City of Tiburon
Bryant v. Yellen
United States v.  Ward
United States v. Sioux  Nation of Indians
Industrial Union v. American Petroleum
EPA v.  National  Crushed Stone Assn
State of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
State of Montana  v. United States
San Diego Gas & Electric v.  City of San Diego
Watt v. Alaska
California  v.  Sierra Club
Hodel v.  Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Act
Hodel v. Indiana
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.  National
Sea Clammers Assn
Metromedia, Inc. v.  City of San Diego
Commonwealth Edison v. State of Montana
Weinberger v.  Catholic  Action of Hawaii Peace
Education Project
Watt v. Energy  Action Educational Foundation
Texaco  v. Short
Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo
Zobel v. Williams
California  ex  rel. State Lands  Comm'n v. United
States
Sporhase v. Nebraska
Colorado v. New Mexico
* Italicized case names are those used in the  "EP" scoring.
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460 U.S.  300
460 U.S.  605
460 U.S.  766
461 U.S.  190
461 U.S.
462 U.S.
462 U.S.
462 U.S.
462 U.S.
463 U.S.
463 U.S.
463 U.S.
464  U.S.
464  U.S.
466  U.S.
466  U.S.
466  U.S.
467 U.S.  1
467 U.S.  229
467 U.S.  310
467 U.S.  837
467 U.S.  986
469 U.S.  274
469 U.S.  504
470 U.S.  93
470 U.S.  116
471 U.S.  84
471 U.S.  759
473 U.S.  172
473 U.S.  568
473 U.S.  753
474 U.S.  121
474 U.S.  494
475 U.S.  1
475 U.S.  89
475 U.S.  355
476 U.S.  227
476 U.S.  498
476 U.S.  834
477 U.S.  131
477 U.S.  207
477 U.S. 340
478 U.S.  221
North Dakota v.  United States
Arizona v. California
Metropolitan Edison Co. v.  People Against Nuclear
Energy
Pacific Gas & Electric v.  State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Comm'n
Block  v. North Dakota
Watt v. Western  Nuclear, Inc
Baltimore Gas & Electric v.  NRDC
Texas  v.  New  Mexico
Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon
Nevada v. United States
United States v. Mitchell
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache  Tribe of Indians
Silkwood v.  Kerr Mc-Gee Corp.
Secretary of the Interior  v.  California
Louisiana  v. Mississippi
Summa Corp v.  California
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v.  La Jolla Band of
Mission Indians
Kirby Forest Industries  v. United States
Hawaii Housing Authority  v. Midkiff
Colorado v. New Mexico
Chevron v.  Natural  Resources Defense Council
Ruckelshaus  v. Monsanto
Ohio v.  Kovacs
United States v. Maine
United States v. Louisiana
Chemical Manufacturer's  Ass'n v.  NRDC
United States v. Locke
Montana v. Blackfeet  Tribe of Indians
Williamson County Regional  Planning v. Hamilton
Bank
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural  Products  Co
Oregon Dept of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath  Tribe
United States v.  Riverside Bayview Homes
Midlantic Nat. Bank v.  New Jersey Dept. of Envt'l
Protection
Pacific  Gas & Electric  Co.  v. Public Utilities
Commn  of Calif
United States v. Maine
Exxon Corp. v.  Hunt
Dow Chemical v.  United States
South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe
United States v. Mottaz
Maine  v. Taylor
Offshore  Logistics,  Inc. v. Tallentire
MacDonald,  Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County
Japan Whaling Ass'n v.  American Cetacean Soc.
* Italicized case names  are those used in the "EP" scoring.
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Cite
478 U.S.  546
478 U.S.  597
479 U.S. 481
480 U.S. 370
480 U.S. 470
480 U.S. 531
480 U.S. 572
480 U.S.  700
481 U.S. 412
481 U.S.  704
482 U.S.  124
482 U.S.  193
482 U.S. 304
483 U.S. 711
483 U.S. 825
484 U.S. 49
484 U.S.
484 U.S.
485 U.S.
485 U.S.
490 U.S.
490 U.S.
490 U.S.
491 U.S.
491 U.S.
492 U.S.  408
493 U.S.  20
495 U.S.  490
496 U.S.  530
497 U.S.  871
500 U.S.  380
501 U.S.  221
501 U.S.  597
502 U.S.  437
503 U.S.  91
503 U.S.  429
503 U.S.  519
503 U.S.  569
503 U.S.  607
504 U.S.  334
504 U.S.  353
504 U.S.  555
505 U.S.  88
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Pennsylvania v.  Delaware Valley  Citizen's Council
for Clean Air
United States v. James
International  Paper  Co. v.  Ouellette
Stringfellow v. Concerned  Neighbors in Action
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n  v.  DeBenedictis
Amoco Production  Co. v.  Village of Gambell
California Coastal Comm'n v.  Granite  Rock Co.
United States v. Cherokee  Nation of Oklahoma
Tull v. United States
Hodel v. Irving
Texas v. New  Mexico
Utah Division of State Lands v. United States
First  English Evangelical  Lutheran Church of
Glendale v.  County of Los Angeles
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
for Clean Air
Nollan v.  California Coastal Comm'n
Gwaltney of Smithfield v.  Chesapeake Bay
Foundation
Phillips Petroleum  Co. v. Mississippi
ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri
United States v. Louisiana
Lyng  v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n
Cotton Petroleum Corp  v. New Mexico
Robertson v.  Methow Valley Citizens Council
Marsh v.  Oregon Natural  Resources Council
Pennsylvania v.  Union Gas Co.
New Orleans Public Service  Inc. v.  City of New
Orleans
Philip Brendale v.  Confederated  Tribes and Bands
of Yakima  Indiana Nation
Hallstrom v.  Tillamook County
California  v.  FERC
General Motors Corp v. United States
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
Illinois v. Kentucky
Oklahoma v. New Mexico
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier
Wyoming  v. Oklahoma
Arkansas v. Oklahoma
Robertson  v. Seattle Audubon  Society
Yee  v. City of Escondido
United  States v. Alaska
United States Department of Energy v.  Ohio
Chemical Waste Management v.  Hunt
Fort Gratiot  Sanitary Landfill v.  Michigan Dep't of
Natural  Resources
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Gade v.  National Solid Waste Management Ass'n
* Italicized case names are those used in the "EP" scoring.
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Cite  Name*  Decided
505 U.S.  144  New  York  v.  United States  1992
505 U.S. 557  City of Burlington v. Dague  1992
505 U.S.  1003  Lucas v.  South Carolina  Coastal Council  1992
506 U.S. 73  Mississippi v. Louisiana  1992
507 U.S. 584  Nebraska v. Wyoming  1993
508 U.S. 679  South Dakota v.  Bourland  1993
511 U.S. 93  Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v.  Department of Envtl  1994
Quality of the State of Oregon
511 U.S.  328  Chicago v.  Environmental  Defense Fund  1994
511 U.S. 383  C&A  Carbone Inc v.  Town of Clarkstown  1994
511 U.S. 700  PUD, No.  1 of Jefferson County v.  Washington Dept  1994
of Ecology
511 U.S. 809  Key Tronic  Corp. v. United States  1994
512 U.S. 43  City of Ladue v.  Gilleo  1994
512 U.S. 374  Dolan v.  City of Tigard  1994
513 U.S. 527  Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge  & Dock Co; City  of  1995
Chicago v. Great Lakes Dredge  & Dock  Co.
514 U.S. 673  Kansas v. Colorado  1995
515 U.S.  1  Nebraska v.  Wyoming  1995
515 U.S. 687  Babbitt v.  Sweet Home Chapter of Colorado  1995
516 U.S. 22  Louisiana v. Mississippi  1995
516 U.S. 365  United States v.  Maine  1996
516 U.S. 479  Meghrig v.  KFC Western, Inc.  1996
519 U.S. 234  Babbitt v. Youpee  1997
519 U.S. 355  Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Association  1997
520 U.S.  154  Bennett v. Spear  1997
520 U.S. 725  Suitum v. Tahoe Regional  Planning Agency  1997
521 U.S.  1  United States v.  Alaska  1997
521 U.S. 261  Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho  1997
521 U.S. 507  City of Boerne  v. Flores  1997
521 U.S. 591  Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor  1997
522 U.S. 329  South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe  1998
522 U.S. 520  Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal  1998
Government
523 U.S. 83  Steel Co. v.  Citizens for a Better Environment  1998
523 U.S. 726  Ohio Forestry Ass'n v.  Sierra Club  1998
523 U.S. 767  New Jersey v. New York  1998
524 U.S. 38  United States v. Beggerly  1998
524 U.S. 51  United States v.  Bestfoods  1998
526 U.S. 687  City of Monterey v.  Del Monte Dunes  1999
526 U.S. 865  Amoco Production Company  v. Southern Ute  1999
Indian Tribe
* Italicized case names are  those used  in the "EP" scoring.
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